The judicialization of international law : reflections on the empirical turn. by Hernández,  G.I.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 November 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Hernandez, G.I. (2014) 'The judicialization of international law : reﬂections on the empirical turn.', European
journal of international law., 25 (3). pp. 919-934.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chu066
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in European Journal of
International Law following peer review. The version of record Hernandez, G.I. (2014) 'The judicialization of
international law : reﬂections on the empirical turn.', European journal of international law., 25 (3). pp. 919-934 is
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chu066.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
PRELIMINARY DRAFT: not for circulation 
 
 1 
THE JUDICIALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON THE EMPIRICAL TURN 
 
Karen J Alter. The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2014. Pp. 450 + xxiii. £65.00. ISBN: 9780691154749 
 
Cesare PR Romano, Karen J Alter, and Yuval Shany (eds). The Oxford Handbook of 
International Adjudication. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 975 + xcii. £125.00. 
ISBN: 9780199660681. 
 
Yuval Shany. Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. Pp. 322 + xix. £70.00. ISBN: 9780199643295. 
 
Gleider I Hernández* 
Abstract 
 
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals in the last two decades has been an 
important new development in international law, and the three books under review are at the 
vanguard in substantiating the claim that the judicialisation of international law reflects its 
deepened legalisation. All three have adopted ambitious empirical frameworks through which 
to assess the impact of international courts, and present valuable insights with respect to the 
phenomenon. Whilst all seek to make intelligible the growing practice of the various 
international courts, their empirical methodology and mapping exercise reflects a faith that 
the legalisation/judicialisation of international law is a positive development, one that might 
nevertheless be contested. With the Oxford Handbook’s mapping exercise, Karen Alter’s 
‘altered politics’ model of effectiveness, and Yuval Shany’s ‘goal-based’ method for assessing 
effectiveness, the three books represent the forefront of scholarly efforts to cognise the 
practice of international courts. One should be careful, however: because the empirical 
exercise attempted in these three books goes beyond mere description into an attempt to 
model future outcomes, it has the drawback of privileging certain modes of cognising the 
phenomenon of the proliferation of international courts. Although an important contribution, 
 2 
a solely empirical approach would create the impression of a purely linear progression in the 
judicialisation of international law, which might not be borne out in reality. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Debates over the role of international courts and tribunals in the development of 
international law have percolated since the proliferation of such bodies in the period since 
1990. The judicial settlement of international disputes, previously confined to certain 
specified fields and limited only to a small subset of actors, has spread into virtually all areas 
of common concern. Whether the inevitable by-product of an increasingly globalised form of 
governance or perhaps the very midwife of this phenomenon, the emergence of international 
courts and tribunals as influential normative actors in the development of international law is 
now firmly embedded in the global legal landscape.
1
 
The three books under review are the culmination of more than a decade of coordinated 
efforts within the Project on International Courts and Tribunals network.
2
 These efforts 
aimed to systematise and understand the impact of international courts on international law. 
Their conscious coordination is illustrated by the fact that both Alter and Shany, having  each 
published a monograph on the topic, are also lead editors of the Oxford Handbook. Published 
in rapid succession at the start of 2014, the three books together represent the high point of 
these efforts towards systematisation, adopting a consciously empirical approach in their 
                                                 
* D.Phil (Wadham College, Oxford), LL.M (Leiden), LL.B & BCL (McGill). Senior Lecturer in Law & Deputy 
Director of the Global Policy Institute, University of Durham. Email: g.i.hernandez@durham.ac.uk. 
1
 The present author’s own work has explored the theme, in relation to the International Court of Justice: see GI 
Hernández, The International Court and the Judicial Function (2014). 
2
 As expressly recognised by Romano, Shany and Alter in the Oxford Handbook, at vii: both Romano and 
Shany are directors within the network, and Alter has been associated to the project for many years.  
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approach to international courts, which together have generated a wealth of findings. In many 
respects, these three books are a high-water mark in the turn to empiricism that has recently 
coloured international legal scholarship. 
In this review I neither endorse nor contest the authors’ empirical methodology 
adopted, but seek to engage with each book’s approach. The fact that empirical methods not 
traditionally deployed in the international legal discipline are now being used poses no 
existential threat. Yet, to employ them effectively, one must proceed with some care. As with 
any method it is important to assess which findings the empirical approach privileges. This 
review essay, in the span of a few thousand words, cannot quibble with small methodological 
points in the findings of the authors, which cover the practice of nearly all currently-operating 
international courts. Instead, the overarching perspective adopted here seeks to identify the 
narrative by which the authors of the works under review justify the empirical turn. What 
have the authors sought to achieve by adopting this approach to their study of international 
courts? Do these methods in fact achieve what has been sought? Finally, does the empirical 
approach privilege certain outcomes in the assessment of how international courts participate 
in international legal processes?  
 
2 Methodology 
 
In studying these volumes, one sees how a variety of seemingly divergent 
methodological approaches nevertheless share some commonalities of form and substance. 
The Oxford Handbook attempts to bring together its 40-odd individual chapters through a 
common focus on the phenomenon of ‘international adjudication’ writ large. Rather than 
concentrating on international judicial institutions per se, they in fact seek to broaden the 
focus to all bodies, whether permanent or impermanent, national or domestic, which 
participate in ‘the broader trends toward international legalization and the judicialisation of 
 4 
international relations’.3 Such a broader perspective suggests that the phenomenon of 
international adjudication—or at the very least, commonalities in the practices of the various 
adjudicative bodies—is worthy of scholarly attention. The Oxford Handbook’s structure 
reflects this, with its first two Parts dedicated to a ‘mapping’ exercise, first taking the reader 
through a history of international adjudication and the acceleration of proliferation in the last 
decades, and canvassing the existing institutions and their various fields of competence. The 
four latter Parts are then structured around various themes that seek to systematise a range of 
cross-cutting issues: in relation to theoretical approaches (Part III); contemporary issues and 
challenges (Part IV); and key actors, extending beyond judges and parties but also to 
advocates and litigators, prosecutorial and defence teams in international criminal law, and 
even to the role of legal secretaries and registries (Part V). Finally, Part VI raises selected 
legal and procedural issues governing the topic, such as jurisdictional questions and inherent 
powers of international courts, the roles of third parties, experts and other fact-finders, and 
the remedies that a court can indicate. The approach taken in the Oxford Handbook is 
unusually taxonomic: it aspires to provide a comprehensive resource that describes the 
plethora of existing institutions and the debates that are associated with them, whilst 
simultaneously seeking to constitute itself as a repository of contemporary practice and 
challenges facing international adjudication. For this reason, it departs from the traditional 
style of legal scholarship in its generous use of tables in its annexes and a helpful and detailed 
pullout chart, presenting data on the world’s international courts in a manner redolent of the 
charts distributed by the National Geographic Society.  
The monographs by Alter and Shany have a more specific focus. (“Assessing the 
Effectiveness of International Courts” by Yuval Shany can be counted as a monograph as 
Shany has written the first seven chapters himself and co-written the five case studies with 
                                                 
3
 Oxford Handbook, Foreword, at ix.  
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other scholars.) Karen Alter’s international relations and political science background 
informs her approach to international courts as active participants in developing the ‘political 
resource’ that is international law.4 Her theoretical framework aims to situate and describe 
how international law is deployed within the practices and work of international courts and 
judges to secure a number of political objectives, especially those embedded in their own 
constitutive instruments; she puts forward what she calls her ‘altered politics’ framework, an 
empirical approach through which the influence of international courts is measured by their 
ability to influence politics so as to advance the political objectives already inscribed in the 
law.
5
 This approach breaks from traditional legal scholarship as it seeks to situate judicial 
reasoning both within the political context, but suggests that a court’s influence on relevant 
actors may be objectively identifiable. She then applies the altered politics framework to a 
wide array of some eighteen case studies, spanning virtually all areas in which international 
courts are engaged. Divided into chapters focussed around the ‘roles’ international courts 
may play—law enforcement, dispute settlement, administrative review and ‘constitutional 
review’—the eighteen case studies are used primarily to illuminate how the dynamics of 
international courts play out in relation to what she calls their ‘compliance constituencies’, or 
the partners and supporters who together work to strengthen and support international courts 
and generate compliance with their decisions.
6
 Alter’s analysis aims above all at clarification 
of the field; through the mapping of these institutional practices from an external perspective, 
she seeks to reconstruct how international law is used by international courts in order to 
assess the political choices that animate and justify such usages, and the role of international 
courts in influencing these choices—in short, in altering politics. 
                                                 
4
 Recognised expressly in Alter, at xvii. 
5
 Ibid., at 19-26, esp 24-5. 
6
 Ibid., at 20-1. 
 6 
Yuval Shany’s background assumptions are somewhat more easily reconcilable with 
the methods known to international lawyers, but equally focussed on creating a taxonomy 
through which to systematise the variegated practices of international courts. With his ‘goal-
based approach to effectiveness analysis’ sketched out in Chapter 1, Shany seeks to challenge 
presumptions that international courts and tribunals automatically lead to a strengthening of 
the international legal order in which they operate; he favours an empirical approach to assess 
the effectiveness and impact of international courts and tribunals.
7
 This is a difficult task for 
international lawyers: effectiveness in relation to what purposes? Effectiveness according to 
which standard? Shany in his conceptual ‘goal-based framework’, tries to move beyond 
classic yet unmeasurable criteria such as compliance, ‘usage rate’, and their normative impact 
on State behaviour. For him, effectiveness is a measure of the ‘attainment of the mandate 
providers’ goals’,8 understood both as the legal mandate that has been embodied in the 
constitutive instrument of an international court, as well as the ‘normative expectations of 
their mandate providers’, which ‘often reflect plausible conceptions of generally shared 
socially desirable ends’.9  His framework is then applied to a series of five case studies, each 
centred around a specific judicial institution. In these case studies each institution is carefully 
described and situated in relation to its practice.  
Shany’s goal-based approach, which emphasises the importance of mandate providers, 
is strikingly similar to Alter’s description of international courts as beholden to the political 
choices embedded in the law and their own mandate. Yet there is an important distinction 
between Shany and Alter: where Alter seeks to identify, from an external viewpoint, the 
methods through which international law is deployed as a political resource, Shany seeks to 
                                                 
7
 Shany, at 3. 
8
 Ibid., at 6-7. 
9
 Ibid. 
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evaluate whether the practices of international courts conform to a pre-existing set of 
standards and goals already set out for international courts by their mandate providers, an 
essentially internal exercise. Taken as a pair for a moment, Shany and Alter’s books are 
highly complementary, and serve to inform the more practical taxonomical exercise 
undertaken in the Oxford Handbook.  
The underlying premise behind these books is a two-fold faith: that there is value in 
studying the body of practice being generated within international judicial fora; and that 
systematisation brings with it the possibility of making that body of practice intelligible, and 
with it, international law. To the extent that systematisation allows scholars to cognise and 
make sense of the world around them, there is surely value in seeking to situate the immense 
body of adjudicative practice within a system of knowledge. Yet equally so, an attempt to 
address and create knowledge through facts carries with it certain consequences, not least of 
which is that the choice to privilege certain facts in constructing a description is one that is 
inevitably value-laden.
10
 The common thread found in these three books thus goes further 
than merely engaging in a mapping exercise as to the impact of these variegated practices. 
There are two specific normative convictions  embedded within these three books: that 
international adjudication contributes, or at least has the potential to contribute, to the 
legalisation of international governance; and that this process of legalisation is, in the main, a 
positive development. It recognises the contribution of international courts to the 
development of international law,
11
 yet seeks to go further and to measure and explain that 
contribution according to whether that change has been qualitatively for the ‘better’. In so 
doing, the value-laden nature of the exercise takes it beyond mere description and adheres, to 
a point, to pre-existing standards or notions of justice which colour the analysis. In all three 
                                                 
10
 See eg A Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 609, 624-5.  
11
 See Alter, at 23-4, and Shany, at 6. 
 8 
books, an attempt is made to suggest such standards of justice are internal to the work of 
international courts. Chapter 2 of Shany’s book is particularly noteworthy in this regard. In 
this chapter he articulates a claim through which the ability of a court to mould its judgments 
so as to comply with the political wishes of mandate providers is the benchmark for the 
legitimacy and authority its judgments should command.
12
 
One also can observe this conviction expressed in the sections which seek to trace a 
history of international adjudication. Mary Ellen O’Connell and Lenore VanderZee’s 
contribution to the Oxford Handbook is essentially a narrative of progress, tracing various 
developments favouring the peaceful settlement of international disputes into the culmination 
of international courts vested with compulsory jurisdiction and with the competence to hear 
claims from a variety of non-State actors.
13
 Their primary concern with the present system 
rests primarily with the proliferation of international tribunals, and the fact that they may be 
too effective, leading to the fragmentation of the law.
14
 Alter’s world history of international 
courts, which seeks in turn to trace the emergence of international courts back to key 
historical events which sparked ‘bottom-up demands’ to ‘make governments and legislatures 
open to accepting greater international judicial oversight’, is not much different in its 
linearity.
15
 Although her historical genealogy takes greater account of the political ideals and 
commitments of the creators of the various international courts, the sheer breadth of the 
courts surveyed makes much of it perfunctory, situating the judicialisation of international 
                                                 
12
 Shany, at 31 et seq. One finds a similar approach in Alter’s ‘altered politics’ framework, sketched out at 19-
26. The concern about the legitimacy of judicial law-making is equally present in the Oxford Handbook: see JE 
Álvarez, ‘The Main Functions of International Adjudication’, at 172-3; A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, at 510-
11; and S Besson, at 421-2. 
13
 O’Connell and VanderZee, in Oxford Handbook, at 56-7. Their analysis depends in particular on Hans 
Kelsen’s demand for a competent court, with compulsory jurisdiction, as an indispensable ‘core’ for any future 
world organization: see H Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations (1942), at 151-2. 
14
 O’Connell and VanderZee, ibid., at 41. 
15
 Alter, at 112. 
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law primarily as a historical phenomenon that was motivated by a discrete set of factual 
circumstances
16
. This atomistic approach leads one to presume the value of legalism, without 
fully understanding the discourses and patterns which lead to its widespread acceptance on 
the international plane. Fortunately, Alter correctly identifies the modesty of her own 
approach, calling for a fuller account of local histories and mulling over the continued 
resistance to the international rule of law.
17
 Committed to the international rule of law as 
being amongst ‘goals inscribed in international law’,18 she nevertheless displays an 
ambivalence about how those goals will continue to be pursued in the future. 
This review essay cannot, in the limited space available, challenge meaningfully this 
value-laden approach; in many respects, the very topic of studying international adjudication 
in this empirical form presumes, if not demands, that a commitment be made as to the value 
of international adjudication. Instead, more interesting is to outline the themes surveyed in 
the various books as they proceed through their various case studies. These themes, which 
centre primarily around the relevant actors, questions of compliance and effectiveness, and 
the overarching theme of institutional and systemic legitimacy, are the first step in attempting 
to identify the motives underlying the remarkable systematisation efforts contained in these 
three books. 
 
3 Common Questions 
A. Relevant Actors 
It is hardly surprising that three books dedicated to mapping the phenomenon of 
international adjudication concentrate on ascertaining the relevant actors. In the introductory 
                                                 
16
 This is especially evident in Alter’s account of the diverging approaches of Europe and the United States to 
the proliferation of international courts in the last two decades: ibid., at 157. 
17
 Ibid., at 160. 
18
 Ibid. 
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chapter of the Oxford Handbook, co-authored by Cesare Romano, alongside Alter and Shany, 
ruminations as to the distinction between judicial and arbitral bodies demonstrate the 
difficulty in making operative that distinction for the mapping exercise; hence, they choose to 
make no distinction between them.
19
 Accordingly, the Handbook adopts a very broad 
approach: from the Permanent Court of Arbitration, institutional precursor to the ICJ and 
indirectly to other international courts (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Chapter 3), it goes beyond the 
permanent courts dedicated to inter-State disputes (Sean D Murphy, Chapter 9), the 
international criminal courts (William Schabas, Chapter 10) and the international human 
rights courts (Solomon T Ebobrah, Chapter 11), all the way to the investment tribunals 
constituted under the ICSID Convention (Christoph Schreuer, Chapter 14); and temporary 
international claims and compensation bodies such as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
and the United Nations Compensation Commission (David Caron, Chapter 13).  
Alter takes a similarly expansive approach in her definition of ‘new-style’ international 
courts, through which she has sought to identify a trend away from ‘old-style’ courts, lacking 
in compulsory jurisdiction, with competence only over State-to-State disputes, and acting in 
relative isolation from other international courts and domestic courts.
20
 To her mind, ‘new-
style’ international courts depart from old-style courts in many or all of these respects, being 
vested with compulsory jurisdiction, allowing for access for non-State actors (be they 
prosecutorial bodies, private litigants, or international organisations/organs thereof), and even 
the possibility of initiating proceedings for the review of a domestic court decision.
21
  
                                                 
19
 Romano, Alter and Shany, in Oxford Handbook, at 9-10. 
20
 Alter, at 81-82; she later develops the practice of so-called ‘old-style’ courts in Chapter 5. 
21
 Ibid., at 82-83. At 84, she has prepared a chart of the 24 courts she has used in her case study, which are 
categorised according to the extent to which they conform with her ‘new-style’ framework.   
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There is a deliberate under-emphasis of traditional international courts like the ICJ, in 
favour of the ‘new-style’ international courts, in both these books.22 Shany points out that the 
ICJ’s ability to command compliance enjoys only limited success according to traditional, 
causation-based analyses. However, with his goal based approach he favours a more 
contextual analysis as (although the Court generally focuses on the settlement of the disputes 
before it) the ICJ has contributed to the legitimisation of the international legal regime of 
which it plays a part, in a manner which traditional compliance measures cannot account 
for.
23
 As Alter would put it, this is a limited contribution, due to the fact that the ICJ is the 
most old-style of all international courts, with weak enforcement mechanisms, lacking 
compulsory jurisdiction, and only a limited capacity to affect compliance with its decisions. 
Perhaps for this reason, Alter only elects to study one of its cases, the territorial dispute 
between Qatar and Bahrain, suggesting that the ICJ may have a limited ability to contribute 
politically to the resolution of international disputes,
24
 and that its ability to induce 
compliance falls short of the wider array of methods associated to ‘new-style’ international 
courts, vested with compulsory jurisdiction, stronger enforcement mechanisms, and with a 
wider competence than merely State-to-State disputes.  
What makes this choice of emphasis problematic is that it overstates the extent of the 
judicialisation of international law as a matter of fact. Most of Alter’s ‘new-style’ 
international courts are smaller, regional institutions with very limited subject-matter 
competence; as Nico Krisch pointed out in a brief online comment on Alter’s book, most of 
these smaller actors operate only within limited geographical spaces (primarily Europe and 
                                                 
22
 It is true that the topic was covered in 2004 by C Schulze, Compliance at the International Court of Justice 
(2004), primarily in relation to a close analysis of all the Court’s cases to that date.  
23
 Shany, at 185-7. 
24
 Alter, at 177. 
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Latin America), and within three limited issue areas (economic regulation, human rights and 
mass atrocities), leading to his metaphor of ‘islands’ of judicialisation, which is rather 
different than Alter’s linear narrative of a bottom-up process of judicialisation.25 The Oxford 
Handbook is similar in its scope, but that is to be expected, given its emphasis on mapping 
and not merely on impact.  
This choice to emphasise breadth of scope, if taken purely at face value, does present a 
narrative of progressive judicialisation that should always remain in the background of the 
careful reader’s mind when studying these books. It is somewhat compensated by Shany’s 
more restrained selection of case studies, confined to studying the effectiveness of five 
permanent institutions (the ICJ, the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the ICC, the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union). Yet despite the 
differing approaches, Shany and Alter share much and in fact build on one another’s 
frameworks: to use but one example, Shany’s effectiveness analysis, as employed in the last 
chapters of his book, presumes that the features which characterise Alter’s ‘new-style’ courts 
equally contribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the various international courts.  
An interesting side observation is given in André Nollkaemper’s piece in the Oxford 
Handbook, where he situates the engagement of domestic courts with international law within 
the wider phenomenon of international adjudication.
26
 His account is essentially interactional; 
it is not merely that national courts engage with international law, but rather, that despite 
diverging normative and systemic foundations, the two categories of courts can interact with 
one another, complementing each other’s functions, in particular when domestic courts 
exercise enforcement and implementation functions that may be lacking on the international 
                                                 
25
 This point was taken up in N Krisch, ‘The Path of Judicialization: A Comment on Karen Alter’s The New 
Terrain of International Law’, posted to EJIL:Talk on 23 April 2014 (available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
path-of-judicialization-a-comment-on-karen-alters-the-new-terrain-of-international-law/).  
26
 Nollkaemper, in Oxford Handbook, at 525. 
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level. Conversely, international courts are strongest in respect of ‘normative development’, 
systematising practice and the decisions of national courts (and of States), identifying new 
international legal norms, and even occasionally serving to review (albeit indirectly) the 
decisions of national courts.
27
 This interactional account has some purchase when one takes 
into account the lack of institutional or systemic hierarchy in the international legal system. 
Courts do not exist in a vacuum: beyond the States that may have constituted them and 
who act as Shany’s mandate providers, international courts also form part of what Stanley 
Fish called ‘interpretive communities’28 in which their ability to command authority demands 
that they comply with a certain vision of the system that they inhabit. The Oxford Handbook 
identifies a number of these constituencies within these interpretive communities whose 
professional engagement with international courts is direct, and who enjoy indirect 
legitimacy: other international judges and arbitrators, not in their institutionalised capacity 
but as individuals (Swigart and Terris, Chapter 28); the so-called ‘international bar’ of 
international law practitioners (Sthoeger and Wood, Chapter 29, and Vauchez, Chapter 30); 
and prosecutors and defence counsel (Heller, Chapter 31, and Gibson, Chapter 32). The 
common thread in all these chapters is the emphasis on what Oscar Schachter called the 
‘invisible college of international lawyers’,29 a community of scholars purportedly bound 
together by a common cause of international justice and the preservation of law in 
                                                 
27
 Nollkaemper, in Oxford Handbook, at 542-3. A high-profile recent decision of an international court that 
essentially served to review and reject the decision of a national court is the ICJ’s 2012 judgment in 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, where the ICJ, 
ruling on the same subject matter as the Italian Court of Cassation, declared that the latter court had erred in its 
interpretation of international law, and that Germany had suffered direct injury from the law breach of 
international law occasioned by that error. 
28
 A concept famously elaborated in S Fish, ‘Interpreting the Variorum’, in S Fish, Is there a Text in this Class? 
The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980), at 147-72. 
29
 O Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’ (1977) 2 Northwestern University Law Review 
72. 
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international society.
30
 Even the roles of the prosecutor and defence counsel are given 
systemic importance, their independence and accountability serving to buttress the legitimacy 
of the wider system of international criminal justice.
31
 Such a conception of international 
courts as accountable to a wider community is strikingly similar to Alter’s concept of 
‘compliance constituencies’, discussed above, and plays an important role in securing 
judgment-compliance in Shany’s goal-based framework. But that sense of inter-dependence, 
and even of inter-changeability
32
 between the different practice communities also has a 
darker side; it suggests a group of elites who dominate the form and procedures of 
international adjudication, imposing their substantive preferences on the community, and 
even serving to exclude other actors who might contest the linearity and legalisation of the 
international legal order.  
B. Compliance and Effectiveness 
International adjudicative processes cannot be understood merely through an analysis 
of the interaction of international courts with one another. The parties appearing before them, 
and the degree to which they are prepared to comply with the decisions of international 
courts, play a key role. All three books favour an empirical approach in ascertaining 
compliance: in the Oxford Handbook, Alexandra Huneeus (Chapter 20) suggests that 
assessing judgment compliance is an essentially relational exercise. Huneeus describes this 
assessment exercise as requiring one to establish a causal link between what the ruling 
                                                 
30
 Swigart and Terris, in Oxford Handbook, at 637; Sthoeger and Wood, in Oxford Handbook, at 652; Vauchez, 
in Oxford Handbook, at 660. 
31
 Heller, in Oxford Handbook, at 689; Gibson, in Oxford Handbook, at 694. 
32
 The point that international judges often are elected after a period of practice in another capacity, be it 
advocate, State counsel or legal secretary is not lost: see Swigart and Terris, in Oxford Handbook, at 628-9; and 
Cartier and Hoss, in Oxford Handbook, at 725. The fact that already the international community of 
practitioners is equally restricted and elite (Sthoeger and Wood, in Oxford Handbook, at 647) would further 
compound the lack of accesbility. 
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demands and the behaviour of the parties subject to that ruling,
33
 and suggests further study in 
this area. Shany and Alter do not adopt such a relational perspective. Shany suggests that a 
number of operational categories can help to measure effectiveness in relation to international 
courts: whether the tangible or intangible resources or assets available to the organisation 
actually enable it to meet its objectives (structural); whether the organisational processes 
sufficiently facilitate the aims of the organisation (process); and whether the outputs and their 
social effects are in conformity with the organisation’s goals (outcomes).34 The goal-based 
approach contextualises any analysis of compliance, departing substantially from an 
essentially dispute-centric approach; although Shany recognises the relative ease with which 
such compliance can be assessed, he suggests that instead, judgment-compliance ought to be 
understood in a broader, contextual sense, in line with the ‘goal-based approach’, and also 
address the impact on the practices of third parties.
35
 Alter’s concept of ‘compliance 
constituencies’ is again apposite: she suggests that more important than the behaviour of the 
parties themselves are the reactions of other governments, judges and relevant actors to the 
ruling of a court.
36
 If the ruling of an international court has the potential to shift the legal 
landscape and modify the manner in which a legal rule or norm is perceived, the normative 
authority commanded by that institution is systemic, and not merely situated within the four 
corners of a dispute. This relatively functionalist understanding of authority differs from the 
democratic justification that Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke invoke to justify the 
international public authority begin commanded by international courts.
37
  
                                                 
33
 Huneeus, in Oxford Handbook, at 443. 
34
 Shany, at 50. 
35
 Ibid., at 118-19. 
36
 Alter, at 348-9. 
37
 See eg A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial 
Lawmaking’ (2012) 12(5) German Law Journal 1341, at 1343. 
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With their case studies, Shany and Alter make an effort to implement this broader 
understanding of compliance and effectiveness in their analysis of the practice of 
international courts. Given the breadth of her approach, Alter has elected to focus on a few 
particular proceedings before a number of international courts; she distinguishes between the 
inter-State and the ‘private actor’ contexts. This distinction is key because, to Alter, inter-
State disputes retain a strong flavour of arbitration between parties, where international courts 
tailor their legal findings to politically acceptable outcomes, and thus enhance their 
legitimacy through what is a quintessentially transactional approach.
38
 Conversely, the 
private litigant-initiated dispute settlement systems, such as human rights courts and 
investment tribunals, seem to embody more limited means through which the various parties 
involved can control the proceedings and their relations with each other: in essence, a 
controlled legalisation within a wider political process.
39
 Such private litigant-initiated 
mechanisms, for Alter, departs from the transactionalism of the inter-State approach and 
contributes to a general climate of legalisation. 
C. Institutional Preservation and Legitimacy  
The temptation for institutional self-preservation within international courts is strong. 
Perhaps due to the relatively limited compliance mechanisms available to them, international 
courts have developed methods through which to safeguard their legitimacy and their 
systemic importance well beyond the confines of a given proceeding or dispute. Alter 
identifies the ‘multilateral adjudication model’, where international courts reshape 
international politics through the creation of new legal rules, primarily through interpretations 
that come to constrain other actors within that system, including States.
40
 Shany captures the 
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 Alter at 176. 
39
 Ibid., at 192. 
40
 Alter, at 47. 
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phenomenon of self-preservation and extends it further, with the idea of ‘regime support’, 
through which international courts discharge their mission with a view not only to 
interpreting and applying legal rules in order to settle disputes, but equally with respect to the 
overarching regime in which they operate.
41
 Such a systemic approach serves to legitimate 
both the judicial institution itself, but also public authority at the international level, with 
international courts tasked with securing the legitimacy of the international legal system 
itself.
42
 This link between institutional self-preservation and system preservation seems borne 
out in the various case studies he undertakes, notably with respect to the practice of the 
International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organisation, and the various international 
criminal tribunals in operation.  
A key point taken up by Alter in her assessment of regime support is what she calls 
‘international constitutional review’. She considers whether international courts, when 
assessing the validity of law-creating acts, have been delegated a ‘constitutional review 
function’ in line with ‘higher order legal principles—usually the organization’s founding 
treaty and human rights obligations that are binding on the organization and its members’.43 
Again, one must be careful not to overstate the constitutional review function, as international 
courts with a constitutional review power are few in number. Only five are identified by 
Alter, all being regional courts situated within wider regional integration organisations, and 
most being modelled on the European Court of Justice.
44
 Although in such organisations, 
regional courts can contribute to a political culture in which legislation and actions by States 
and governmental authorities can be brought to account, much as in the domestic law model, 
                                                 
41
 Shany, at 43-4. 
42
 Ibid., at 45-6. 
43
 Alter, at 286. 
44
 Although the Caribbean Court of Justice is unique amongst these, as it can exercise constitutional review 
when it serves as an appellate body for national judicial rulings. 
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the relative lack of courts with such constitutional review powers on the international plane 
limits the utility of Alter’s constitutional review argument, as it applies only to a very limited 
subset of international courts. 
This does not suggest, however, that the international courts not vested with 
constitutional review powers cannot exercise legitimate authority. Several contributors to the 
Oxford Handbook have picked up on the strategies and techniques used by international 
courts to buttress their authority and that of the international legal system more broadly. 
Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke (Chapter 23) touch upon the adjudicative tendency to 
reinforce institutional authority through argument via precedent, which feeds into general 
legal discourse by establishing judicial decisions as authoritative reference points for later 
legal practice.
45
 The point is also taken up by Samantha Besson (Chapter 19) and Mikael 
Rask Masden (Chapter 18), both of whom essentially situate judicial law-making as a 
systemic process, one only tenable when understood by reference to a primary law-making 
authority and verified institutionally within a legal system, for example by assessing 
compliance by relevant actors.
46
 This view is characterised by an emphasis on the 
stabilisation of normative expectations and the contribution of international courts to the 
structural functioning of the system.
47
 In this respect, the legitimacy of the court and the 
legitimacy of the system seem to go hand in hand. 
The link between the legitimacy of a court and the system in which it operates extends 
also to the legitimisation function of international courts, to confer legitimacy on the norms 
and institutions that constitute the regime in which they operate.
48
 Such legitimacy is linked 
                                                 
45
 Von Bogdandy and Venzke, in Oxford Handbook, at 508. 
46
 Besson, in Oxford Handbook, at 421-22; Rask Madsen, in Oxford Handbook, at 396. 
47
 Rask Madsen, ibid. 
48
 Shany, at 137. 
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to two primary factors in a court’s engagement with a given legal norm: source–the 
legitimacy of a norm derives from the accepted authority of its source (eg a binding treaty, an 
uncontested norm of customary law); and process–the legitimacy of a norm relates to the 
process through which a norm came to be created and regarded as valid.
49
 Legitimacy in this 
sense is content-independent: it depends not on the quality of the reasoning which it deploys, 
but on the authority that it can command qua institution. These criteria, reminiscent of Hart’s 
‘sources thesis’ and Kelsen’s search for the ultimate Grundnorm, help to situate the 
legitimacy of a court within the legitimacy of a system. 
There is a third criterion to assess the legitimacy of adjudication, namely, the outcome 
that it generates. The ‘outcome legitimacy’ of a norm applied by a court is classically 
content-dependent, and decouples legitimacy from the source of the norm or the process 
through which it was created. The outcome legitimacy of a judicial decision is dependent on 
whether a decision can be reconciled with certain standards of fairness and justice, or whether 
it may be seen as illegitimate for failing to comply with such standards. In this regard, the 
decisions of international courts do not depend then on the legitimacy bestowed upon them 
by having emanated from the international court, but rather, on the effects of the judicial 
decision itself and its conformity to certain standards. Although Shany has suggested that 
outcome legitimacy can serve to bridge questions of effectiveness on a practical level with 
broader notions of justice,
50
 the present author would argue that outcome legitimacy is 
essentially instrumental. For this reason, although outcome legitimacy is to be balanced with 
source and process legitimacy, as described above, outcome legitimacy raises a tension with 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., at 141-2. An interesting edited collection on the topic of legitimacy in international law has been 
published elsewhere: see R Wolfrum and V Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (2008). 
50
 Shany, at 145. 
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Shany’s ‘goal-based’ approach and Alter’s ‘normative politics’ view that is never fully 
resolved. 
 
4 Empiricism and Evaluation: Concluding Remarks 
 
International adjudication is entrenched as a powerful institutional phenomenon in the 
21
st
 century: the proliferation of so many international judicial organs, taking on a dizzying 
array of different forms and exercising a vast range of competences, suggests that the 
phenomenon of international adjudication will not soon fade. Legal scholarship today is 
asked to assess how international adjudication influences and contributes to the development 
of contemporary international law. The three books under review represent efforts to 
quantify, measure and assess how international courts have done so; the authors have created 
and have applied ambitious conceptual frameworks to this effect. 
The Oxford Handbook emerges as an indispensable resource for all those interested in 
international adjudication. It represents the distillation and refinement of great debates in the 
area and accommodates a diversity of approaches, ranging from the extremely pragmatic, to 
the forensically descriptive, to the lofty and theoretical. It is a wonderful addition to the 
Oxford Handbook series.  
Shany remains primarily an international lawyer and Alter is a political theorist with a 
deep specialisation in international relations. Yet their long-standing collaboration not only in 
the specific form of the Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication, but also within the 
wider Project on International Courts and Tribunals, has served to inspire a similarity of 
approach and mindset that colours all three of these books. Shany’s efforts to take seriously 
the exhortations towards effectiveness directed at international courts have led him to develop 
an ambitious goal-based analysis that proves successful in its application to a range of 
different institutions. Alter’s goal, which is to find a way to measure accountability in 
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international law with respect to a wider range of stakeholders, and understanding how 
international judicial institutions are contributing to international law’s transformation, has 
equally led her to develop a framework in which to access whether international courts have 
genuinely altered politics; applied to both ‘old-style’ and ‘new-style’ international courts it 
produces important insights on the effectiveness of international courts on influencing 
politics. 
Both authors belie a measure of modesty: despite their best efforts, both concede that 
assessing the effectiveness of international courts remains a difficult enterprise, and one 
which is highly context-dependent and cannot be conducted mechanically by quantitative 
studies of compliance statistics.
51
 However, with that modesty also comes a strong measure 
of idealism, an idealism that requires critical scrutiny in the closing paragraphs of this review 
essay. As Alter seeks to explain in her conclusion, the endeavours of international courts to 
enhance their institutional legitimacy and to support the regimes in which they operate, and 
within which they have been delegated authority, are a powerful contribution to the 
entrenchment of the international rule of law.
52
 Far from dislodging the democratic 
sovereignty that rests primarily within national governmental structure, a shift to international 
courts suggests an end to international autarky, to the idea that the short-term preferences and 
wishes of States should be preeminent. Instead, to Alter and also to Shany, international 
courts uphold international legal norms that signify higher values, such as the rule of law, the 
protection of fundamental human rights, and an entitlement to democracy which are set by 
the ‘mandate providers’ of the various international courts into their constitutive statutes, and 
transcend such interests. International courts are thus, if anything, a means of resistance to the 
unfettered exercise of power by States and governments, as international courts would be 
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seen by Shany as safeguarding the longer-term political values embodied in their constitutive 
statutes, rather than merely short-term interests. The project embodied in these three books 
has sought to demonstrate, empirically, that this is a reality, and that international courts 
increasingly exercise power over the behaviour of governments and individuals, inducing 
them to comply with their judgments based in law. 
An issue remains, one that Alter readily concedes in her concluding chapter: there is 
little reflection on the question of whether international courts should contribute to promote 
political change on the international level.
53
 She is right to admit that ‘there is nothing 
inherently moral, just or legitimate about crafting multilateral agreements with the force of 
law.’54 Whilst acknowledging this flaw, she unfortunately does not continue exploring this 
avenue. This omission may be forgiven, given that the scope and ambition of her entire book, 
not to mention Shany’s book and the Oxford Handbook they jointly edited, is in some 
respects to systematise and make intelligible the practices of international courts. It is safe to 
presume that the authors would not have undertaken such a project were they profoundly 
ambivalent as to the value of their work. To support legalisation and judicialisation of 
international society as a matter of faith takes on a different colour, in this sense; and the 
point must be made that with such an approach, international law, and with it, international 
adjudicatory processes are essentially instrumentalised as policy tools in the service of 
promoting certain values in global governance.
55
 Such an approach does not challenge or 
provide a sufficient account for how power is exercised by judicial elites, and takes for 
granted that an effective contribution by international courts automatically facilitates the 
entrenchment of the international rule of law. To the extent that the authors seek to provide 
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resistance to existing structures of power, their preference for judicialisation institutionalises 
a preference for essentially incremental reform, and belies a continued faith that the 
legalisation of international society will inevitably bring with it positive change. Yet 
ultimately, despite this critique, this trio of books must be commended for presenting a 
coherent, principled approach to nudge international lawyers out of their traditional modes of 
analysis and reasoning. Their sheer breadth and ambition merits much praise and opens up an 
entire new array of questions for debate and for wider scholarly theorising; all deserve a place 
on the bookshelves of international law libraries. 
 
